It is now almost commonplace to hail the success of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. To date, some sixty states are parties to this treaty that standardizes the rules of law applicable to a contract without which trade, be it domestic or international, is unimaginable. 1 The Vienna Convention is doubtless destined, by virtue of the number of states that have ratified it or acceded to it, to become as widely applicable as the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Regrettably, however, a few pockets of resistance still remain. Amongst the absent leaders are the United Kingdom, despite the EU Commission's recommendation to Member States, and Japan. 2

The number of ratifications and accessions is not the sole measure of the success of the Convention. Since coming into force on 1st January 1988, it has most certainly had an effective part to play in regulating international commercial relations. International traders are increasingly abandoning the possibility the Convention gives them of excluding its application. 3 In its model contract for sales of manufactured goods intended for resale, ICC discourages operators from excluding the Vienna Convention. 4 Furthermore, such major instruments of standardization as Incoterms, the Unidroit Principles applicable to international commercial contracts5 and the Principles of European Contract Law, 6 far from rivalling the Convention, are capable of amending or complementing it. 7 And finally, it may also be noted that there has been a marked increase in judicial and arbitral decisions applying the new uniform rules, 8 with arbitrators quick to look favourably upon the Convention as an expression of international trade usages. 9[Page16:]

The way in which courts and arbitrators apply the Convention has been closely studied by scholars. Decisions are increasingly reported and commented upon. 10 Recent editions of works devoted to the Vienna Convention include the lessons now gleaned from case law. 11 Following the example set by UNCITRAL, which arranges for the collection of decisions in which the international conventions drawn up under its auspices are applied, 12 several universities have established data banks of decisions relating to the Vienna Convention. 13 Such collection and analysis is especially necessary in order to maintain and consolidate the standardization of sales law achieved by the Convention, in accordance with the requirement expressed in Article 7(1) CSIG. 14

The main cause of disputes lies in the lack of conformity of the goods alleged by the buyer. The remedies which the Convention offers the buyer in such case can be implemented, however, only if he (or she) first notifies the seller of the defect, 'specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it' (Art. 39(1)). Such notice is entirely understandable: the seller needs to be informed so as to be able to take whatever steps are necessary to defend his interests, particularly with a view to remedying the defect or to collecting relevant evidence in the event of a dispute with the buyer. 15

The consequences of failing to give notice in compliance with these requirements are far-reaching, 16 as the harmed buyer who fails to do so is quite simply deprived of all his rights. 17 There is also the well-known two-year time limit beyond which the buyer can no longer rely on a lack of conformity that was late in becoming apparent (Art. 39(2)).

For the buyer who has not notified the defect in time or in sufficient detail, the Convention nonetheless offers two lifelines. Firstly, under Article 40, the seller cannot rely on the loss of the buyer's right 'if the lack of conformity relates to facts of which he knew or could not have been unaware and which he did not disclose to the buyer'. Thus, the buyer acting in bad faith - and this rule is rightly regarded by commentators as an illustration of the principle of good faith - or with gross negligence shall bear all the consequences arising from lack of conformity. Secondly, according to a rule introduced by way of compromise at the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, where discussions were particularly long and turbulent due to the seriousness of the consequences arising from failure to give notice of defects, 18 the buyer retains part of his rights and may 'reduce the price in accordance with article 50 or claim damages, except for loss of profit, if he has a reasonable excuse for his failure to give the required notice' (Art. 44). Lastly, the buyer's rights are upheld, as illustrated by the decisions made in several cases, if the seller waives the right to rely on loss of the buyer's rights19 or if the seller behaves in a way that is contrary to good faith. 20[Page17:]

It is an understandable tactic for a seller accused of having delivered goods not in conformity to allege that the buyer has not respected his obligation to give notice of the non-conformity. Thus, paradoxically, the centre of gravity of disputes linked to non-conformity has shifted from the seller's fundamental obligation to deliver goods that conform to failure by the victim to give timely notice of the defect. The paradox is even greater if one reflects on the nature of the obligation incumbent upon the buyer. In truth, it is not an obligation, the infringement of which could be sanctioned through damages, but an incumbency, to use terminology taken from that current especially in Switzerland, with the defaulting buyer losing his rights without incurring any liability.

Notification of defects by the buyer is therefore at the heart of many disputes connected with the Vienna Convention. One author, on the basis of the decisions collected in the data bank of Freiburg im Breisgau University, 21 has noted that almost twenty per cent of them were in order to settle problems linked to the buyer's notification of defects. 22 Our wish in this article is to look at the problem that has been the biggest source of uncertainty in case law: 23 how is the 'reasonable time' for giving notice to be understood in the meaning of Article 39(1)? The buyer gives notice of the defect sooner or later, if only during the proceedings against the seller. The pressing question is whether notice was given in time. 24

Although the drafters of the Convention refrained from specifying the length of time for giving notice, an average length, subject to variation, deserves to be advocated, so as to give courts and arbitrators a point of reference. This average length, which has its source in scholarly writing and has been taken up in a certain number of decisions, is one month (II). This reasonable time of one month should not be confused with the prior short period for examination of the goods (I).

I. The reasonable time for giving notice, preceded by the short period for examining the goods

In order to be able to give notice of a lack of conformity, it is necessary to have examined the delivered goods beforehand. It is logical, therefore, that the Convention requires the buyer to examine the goods or cause them to be examined, 'within as short a period as is practicable in the circumstances' (Art. 38(1)). The Convention specifies the starting point for the period only in the cases, frequent in practice, of a contract involving carriage of goods (Art. 38(2)), and redirection and redispatch by the buyer in the event of absence of 'a reasonable opportunity for examination by him and at the time of the conclusion of the contract the seller knew or ought to have known of the possibility of such redirection or redispatch' (Art. 38(3)). In both cases, the examination may be deferred until after the goods have arrived at their destination (Art. 38(2), (3)). In other cases, as commentators unanimously note, the period of examination begins upon delivery of the goods.

There is no specific penalty for failure to conduct the examination within this short period, as the loss of rights provided for in Article 39 applies only if the buyer fails to [Page18:] notify the seller of the defect 'within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it'. The penalty is merely indirect, namely through setting the start of the time allowed for giving notice. This is because for defects which could be detected under the examination required by Article 38, if this examination was not carried out in time, it is the moment when the buyer should have examined the goods, and not the moment when they were actually examined, that marks the starting point of the time for giving notice. Hence, late examination will often result in late notification, but not necessarily so. For one thing, time lost in examining the goods may be made up by quickness in giving notice. Besides this, a delay in the initial examination, or even the complete absence of such an examination, is of no consequence in the case of defects that were latent at the time the risks were transferred and which appeared only later - before expiry of the two-year time limit provided for in Article 39(2), however - but could not be detected at the time of delivery. In this case, the buyer is under an obligation to re-examine the goods, and the starting point of the time allowed for re-examination is not the day on which the goods were delivered, but the moment when they were legitimately suspected of containing defects. 25

Less is at stake, therefore, in respect of the examination period than in respect of the time for giving notice of the defect. Although the Convention prescribes no direct penalty for carrying out the examination later than allowed, courts and arbitrators will nonetheless generally need to check whether the buyer complied with this time limit in order to set the starting point for the notification period. According to Article 38(1), the buyer must act 'within as short a period as is practicable in the circumstances'. The wording used by the Convention means that the speed required of the buyer is greater than that expected of him when required to act within 'a reasonable time' (Art. 39(1)) and less than that called for when the Convention requires a party to act 'immediately' (Art. 71(3)). It goes without saying that the Convention could not lay down a fixed time limit, of one or two weeks for instance, due to the importance of the circumstances of each individual case, to which the Convention explicitly refers. 26 The nature of the goods concerned has a crucial part to play, without any doubt, in such circumstances. Perishable goods need to be examined more quickly than non-perishables. Checking the number of items delivered in a large consignment will require more time than checking a small package. The time needed to check that equipment functions properly will vary depending on how complex the equipment is. In this connection, lengthy tests may be necessary in order to determine whether operating problems are due to a possible lack of conformity or to the way in which the equipment is being used. Another factor is the size of the firm: greater speed may be expected from a large firm than from a one-person business.

It would thus seem to be futile to attempt, as do a few authors, to limit the examination period further by proposing an average length of time that in any case risks being misleading due to the many circumstances that need to be taken into consideration. 27 The necessary flexibility that should be maintained may be illustrated by two court decisions. The Aix-en-Provence Court of Appeal held that the buyer of 196 laminated metal sheets who took forty days to examine them 'has caused the goods to be examined within a short and normal time given the heavy handling the sheets required and the irreducible time imposed by the check'. 28 Three weeks were considered necessary, under Article 38(1), for the buyer of a part intended to be fitted on a paper producing machine and which turned out to be defective during its use, to perform the requisite checks. 29[Page19:]

II. Assessment of the reasonable time for giving notice

The time provided for giving notice of defects under Article 39(1) CISG should be distinguished from the period allowed for examining the goods. Some courts wrongly reason in terms of an overall period for both examination and notification. 30 Each of these time limits needs to be treated separately. 31 The buyer must carry out his examination of the goods in as short a time as possible in the circumstances, but has a reasonable time to give notice of the defect. Owing to the seriousness of the consequences for the buyer of failing to give notice, it was decided, at the early stages of drawing up the Convention, that he would be allowed a reasonable time and not a short time, as set forth in the Hague Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods. 32 Thus, the drafters of the Convention wished the buyer to have the benefit of a longer time than that allowed for examining the goods.

The assessment of this time is unavoidably awkward. A minority of scholars subscribe to the view that 'the Article 39 notice should immediately follow the discovery of the defect, as the buyer usually has no reason to defer giving notice'. 33 Although this stance bears the stamp of good sense, it cannot be accepted, due to the clearly expressed intention of the drafters of the Convention to give the buyer a longer time for giving notice than the short time of the ULIS. Although, unlike Article 38, Article 39 does not refer to circumstances, the overriding majority of scholars makes this time dependent upon various factors. 34 Of these, the most important is the perishable or non-perishable nature of the goods, due to the fact that providing evidence of defects in perishable goods is a source of problems, which increase with the passage of time. Notice must be given quickly, too, when the goods are seasonal or require prompt intervention by an expert. Although it is not necessary to specify in the notice the contemplated means of redress, 35 the reasonable time should be assessed with greater flexibility when the buyer does not intend to give up the goods but simply later claims damages or a price reduction. Lastly, here as elsewhere, any trade usages or established practices between the parties deserve to be taken into account.

Although these factors are pertinent, it would seem highly desirable to set an average length of time in the case of non-perishable goods. No doubt the objection could be made that if the drafters of the Convention did not venture to do so, there is no reason to do so when interpreting it. Yet the Convention now has a life of its own and the efforts made to consolidate the work of standardization undertaken by its fathers deserve to be encouraged. It would be regrettable that on such a sensitive issue as the time for giving notice of defects, differences of opinion transpire or take hold. It is moreover desirable to guide courts and arbitrators in greater detail than does the Convention. Although it is relatively easy to form a concrete idea of the time necessary for examining the goods in as short a period as possible in the circumstances, the time frame for the following stage - notification - is more difficult to decide.

The attempt by some scholars to deduce an average time, subject to variation, hence deserves to be welcomed. These writers are of course by no means minded to suggest an intangible time limit, as the individual circumstances of a case may justify extending or shortening it. [Page20:]

Some writers advocate around one week. 36 Such suggestions are hardly convincing. For one thing, this would be a short time, whereas the Convention gives the buyer an implicitly longer period. And furthermore, these proposals too closely reflect the conception of business that is held in the legal systems to which such writers belong. There is little chance that this time limit will find a foothold with courts and arbitrators, particularly bearing in mind the different legal traditions in this field, with many systems dispensing the buyer from acting promptly when defects appear. Regard must be had to the international nature of the Convention when interpreting it and to the need to promote uniformity in its application (Art. 7(1)). Consideration of the various legal traditions involved has led one author to suggest around one month as an average length of time for giving notice of defects in non-perishable goods. 37

This proposal deserves approval, for the compromise it seeks to achieve and the strong possibility of its being followed in the majority of decisions. A detailed study of state court and arbitral decisions known to date lies beyond our present purposes, 38 but it may be noted that Germany, Switzerland and Austria constitute the most fertile grounds for judicial decisions. During the early years of application of the new uniform law, German decisions on the merits were marked by their rigorous assessment for the buyer of the reasonable time for giving notice, which was more often than not interpreted as a short time. 39 More recently, however, there has been a move towards a more flexible assessment. The German Federal Court of Justice has clearly confirmed a time limit of one month, 40 to which it had given only muted approval in a previous judgment. 41 A Swiss appellate court has also come down clearly in favour of such a time limit. 42 By contrast, the Austrian Supreme Court has rejected this time limit and gone for a '14-day period for examination and notification failing any special circumstances calling for a shortening or lengthening of this period', which it considers appropriate in the light of the different national legal traditions. 43 This over-restrictive stance seems all the less convincing as it combines the periods for examination and notification, which should be kept separate.

Arbitral decisions seem to show more flexibility. Thus, in connection with sales contracts relating to metal sheeting, the International Arbitral Tribunal of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber has held that notice should have been given within two months of delivery, even if the defect was ascertained only when the final addressee had unpacked the goods. 44 This two-month time limit, which one writer has described as generous, 45 covers both the time in which the examination must be carried out and that allowed for giving actual notice. An ICC arbitral award relating to contracts in which a time limit of one month as from delivery was stipulated for bringing a claim has considered it reasonable to uphold this time limit, given that the defect was easily detectable. 46 In an award relating to the delivery of containers to several firms, the Arbitral Tribunal of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and [Page21:] Industry came to contrasting decisions, admitting, in relation to one of the deliveries, that notification of defects in paintwork made more than six weeks after receipt of the goods was within a reasonable time, but, in respect of another delivery, that notice given 32 days after discovery of the defect was late, in view of the fact that 'business between the parties was usually dealt with swiftly'. 47 Other more recent awards show relative strictness. Thus, it has been held, where defects were detectable upon delivery, that 'a period of time which is longer than one month cannot be considered to be reasonable - such a period must be considerably shorter'. 48 Notification of easily detectable defects thirty days after delivery has also been judged to be late. 49

It is interesting to note that the average length of time for notification suggested in scholarly writing and endorsed by the supreme courts in Germany and Austria was adopted in a recent arbitral award. 50 After considering the various lengths of time put forward by commentators, the arbitral tribunal highlighted the aforementioned stance of the Austrian Supreme Court51 in favour of an average time limit of a fortnight, which it would appear to adopt.

It need hardly be pointed out that in order to avoid the problems pertaining to the assessment of the time limit for giving notice, parties would be well advised to specify the length of such period in their contracts. 52 It is understandably in the parties' interests not to set too short a time limit, which would risk being held ineffective under the national law applicable to the contract for questions not covered by the Convention. 53

As has been frequently observed, 54 unification does not end with the adoption of an international convention relating to uniform law. It is necessary for all those responsible for the application of the Vienna Convention to redouble their efforts, assisted by scholarly opinion, to uphold and complete the work of the fathers of the Convention.

1
See list published by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Internet: http://www.uncitral.org/english/status/index.htm

2
In relation to the United Kingdom see Roy Goode, 'Commercial Law in an International Environment' in Commercial Law in the Next Millennium (The Hamlyn Lectures, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1998) 81 at 94-95; Barry Nicholas, 'The United Kingdom and the Vienna Sales Convention: Another Case of Splendid Isolation?' (Rome: Centro di studi e ricerche di diritto comparato e straniero, vol. 9, 1993).

3
See Art. 6 of the Convention stating the supplementary nature of the uniform law.

4
The ICC Model International Sale Contract, ICC Publication No. 556(E), 1997.

5
UNIDROIT, Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 1994.

6
Commission on European Contract Law, Principles of European Contract Law Parts I and II, ed. Ole Lando & Hugh Beale (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000).

7
See Michael J. Bonell, 'Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Alternatives or Complementary Instruments?' (2000) 1:2 Business Law International 89, for an earlier version of the article see [1996] Rev. D.U. 26; on Incoterms see Centre de droit des obligations de l'Université de Paris I, Yves Derains & Jacques Ghestin, eds., La Convention de Vienne sur la vente internationale et les Incoterms (proceedings of colloquium held on 1-2 December 1989) Paris: LGDJ, 1990.

8
Approximately 600 decisions have so far been collected. See Michael R. Will, Twenty Years of International Sales Law Under the CISG - International Bibliography and Case Law Digest (1980-2000) (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000).

9
Jean-Paul Beraudo, 'The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and Arbitration' (1994) 5:1 ICC ICArb. Bull. 60; on the application of the Vienna Convention by arbitrators see also Pierre Mayer, 'L'application par l'arbitre des conventions internationales de droit privé' in L'internationalisation du droit, Mélanges en l'honneur d'Yvon Loussouarn (Paris: Dalloz, 1994) 275.

10
Regular reports include, to name but the most recent: Michael J. Bonell & Fabio Liguori, 'The U.N. Convention on the International Sale of Goods: A Critical Analysis of Current International Case Law' [1997] Rev. D.U. 385 (Part I), 583 (Part II); Ulrich Magnus, 'Wesentliche Fragen des UN-Kaufrechts' [1999] ZEuP 642; Burghard Piltz, 'Neue Entwicklungen im UN-Kaufrecht', [2000] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 553; Claude Witz & the research team at the Universities of La Sarre and Strasbourg, 'Droit uniforme de la vente internationale de marchandises', D.1999.Somm.355, erratum in D.2000.Somm.8.

11
See especially Vincent Heuzé, La vente internationale de marchandises - Droit uniforme (Paris: LGDJ, 2000); John Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 3rd ed. (The Hague: Kluwer, 1999); Ulrich Magnus, 'Wiener UN-Kaufrecht' in J. von Staudinger, Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen (Berlin: Sellier - de Gruyter, 1999); Peter Schlechtriem, ed., Kommentar zum Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht, 3rd ed. (Munich: Beck, 2000).

12
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT).

13
CISG-Online, Freiburg im Breisgau University, http://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/ipr1/cisg/default.htm; Pace University data bank (New York State), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu; CISG-France, La Sarre University, http://witz.jura.uni-sb.de/CISG; for other data banks, classified by country, see http://witz.jura.uni-sb.de/CISG/cisglinks.htm.

14
Art. 7(1) CISG: 'In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade.'

15
See UNCITRAL Secretariat notes on the 1978 draft convention in John Honnold, Documentary History of the Uniform Law for International Sales (Deventer: Kluwer Law International, 1989) at 425.

16
See Herbert Bernstein & Joseph Lookofsky, Understanding CISG in Europe (Kluwer Law International, 1997) at 63, who mention the disastrous consequences that may result from failure to examine and give notice.

17
See Art. 39(1): 'The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not give notice to the seller . . .'

18
See especially J. Honnold, op. cit. supra note 11 at 282ff.

19
See especially German Federal Court of Justice, 25 November 1998, [1999] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 257 (Annot. P. Schlechtriem & M. Schmidt-Kessel) D.1999.Somm.356 (our Annot.).

20
See especially International Arbitral Tribunal of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, 15 June 1994, [1995] Recht der Internationalen Wirschaft 591 (Annot. P. Schlechtriem); Karlsruhe Upper District Court, 25 June 1997, D.1998.Somm.310 (our Annot.).

21
CISG-Online, supra note 13.

22
Markus Linnerz, Die Untersuchungs- und Rügepflicht des Käufers nach dem UN-Kaufrecht (thesis, Europa-Institut, La Sarre University, 2000) at 1.

23
Although sellers often allege a lack of detail in the description of the defect, it is relatively rare for this to lead to a loss of rights. However, some decisions have shown excessive severity. See Munich District Court [1989] Rev. D.U 850; for a more flexible assessment, German Federal Court of Justice, 3 November 1999, [2000] Entscheidungen zum Wirtschaftsrecht 125 (Annot. P. Schlechtriem), D.2000.Somm. (forthcoming, with our Annot.), where the supreme court notes that in relation to machines and technical devices, 'only a description of the disorder, not a statement of its cause, can be required' of the buyer.

24
On this question, see also Camilla Baasch Andersen, 'Reasonable Time in Article 39(1) of the CISG: Is Article 39(1) truly a Uniform Provision?' [1998] Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 63; Anna Veneziano, 'Non Conformity of Goods in International Sales: A Survey of Current Caselaw on CISG' [1997] IBLJ 39.

25
See P. Schlechtriem, Annot. to German Federal Court of Justice, 3 November 1999, supra note 23.

26
Ingeborg Schwenzer in P. Schlechtriem, op. cit. supra note 11, Art. 38, no. 15; Ulrich Magnus in J. von Staudinger, op. cit. supra note 11, Art. 38, no. 40ff.

27
In support of a time limit of 3-4 working days, see Burghard Piltz, Internationales Kaufrecht (Munich: Beck, 1993) at 192; for one of 5 working days, see Ulrich Magnus in Heinrich Honsell, Kommentar zum UN-Kaufrecht (Berlin: Springer, 1997), Art. 38, no. 24.

28
Aix-en-Provence, 21 November 1996, [unreported], may be consulted at CISG-France, http://witz.jura.uni-sb.de/CISG/decisions/211196.htm; the recourse against this decision was rejected by the Court of Cassation which took cover behind the sovereign power of the lower court to judge on the merits: Cass. civ. 1re, 26 May 1999, J.C.P. 2000.E.274 (Annot. Laurent Leveneur), D.2000.Jur.788 (our Annot.).

29
German Federal Court of Justice, 3 November 1999, supra note 23.

30
See especially Austrian Supreme Court, 15 October 1998, [1999] Juristische Blätter (Vienna) 318 (Annot. Martin Karollus).

31
This view is shared by the majority of commentators. See especially I. Schwenzer in P. Schlechtriem, op. cit. supra note 11, Art. 39, no. 15.

32
Art. 39 ULIS.

33
Karl H. Neumayer & Catherine Ming, Convention de Vienne sur les contrats de vente internationale de marchandises, Commentaire, (Lausanne: CEDIDAC (dist'b. Litec), 1993) at 304 [original: 'l'avis de l'article 39 devrait suivre immédiatement la découverte du vice, car l'acheteur n'a, en règle générale, aucune raison de différer sa dénonciation'].

34
One writer has astutely noted that to avoid too much legal uncertainty, circumstances defined as typical should be taken into consideration and not all the circumstances of the case, Magnus, op. cit. supra note 11, Art. 39, no. 42.

35
Particular care should be taken not to confuse notification of defects with declaration of avoidance.

36
Burghard Piltz, supra note 27 at 194, advocates a time limit of 4-7 working days; Ulrich Magnus in H. Honsell, op. cit. supra note 27, Art. 39, no. 21, suggests a week; Gert Reinhart, Kommentar zum Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen vom 11. April 1980 über Verträge über den internationalen Warenkauf (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1991), Art. 39, no. 5, thinks in terms of a few days.

37
I. Schwenzer in P. Schlechtriem, op. cit. supra note 11, Art. 39, no. 17.

38
See especially M. Linnerz, op. cit. supra note 22, C. Baasch Andersen, op. cit. supra note 24, A. Veneziano, op. cit. supra note 24, and our work, Les premières applications jurisprudentielles du droit uniforme de la vente internationale (Paris: LGDJ 1995) at 88ff; also the various case law reports mentioned supra note 10.

39
See our work, op. cit. supra note 38, at 88ff. This severity is still to be found in some recent decisions; see Karlsruhe Upper District Court, 25 June 1997, D.1998.Somm.310 (our Annot.) in support of a time limit for examination of 3-4 days and for notification of defects of around one week for non-perishable goods; Sarrebruck Upper District Court, 3 June 1998, D.1999.Somm.356 (our Annot.) for notification that needed to be given the day chrysanthemums were delivered. See also an Italian decision (Coni Civil Court, 31 January 1996, D.1997.Somm.222 (Annot. Nico Spiegel)), which held notification made 23 days after delivery of sports clothing containing easily detectable defects to be late.

40
3 November 1999, supra note 23.

41
Federal Court of Justice, 8 March 1995, D.1997.Somm.217 (our Annot.).

42
Upper Court of the Canton of Lucerne, 8 January 1997, D.1998.Somm.315 (our Annot.).

43
Austrian Supreme Court, 15 October 1998, supra note 30.

44
Award of 15 June 1994, [1995] Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 590 (Annot. P. Schlechtriem), English version available for consultation at Pace CISG-Database, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940615a4.html.

45
P. Schlechtriem, op.cit. supra note 20 at 594.

46
ICC Case 7331 (1994), [1995] J.D.I. 1001 (Annot. Dominique Hascher), (1995) 6:2 ICC ICArb. Bull. 73.

47
Award of 5 December 1995, case VB/94131, available for consultation at CISG-Online, http://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/ipr1/cisg/urteile/text/163.htm.; summary in CLOUT no. 164.

48
ICC Case 8962 (1997), ICC ICArb. Bull. this issue, infra at 76.

49
ICC Case 8247 (1996), ICC ICArb. Bull. this issue, infra at 53.

50
ICC Case 9083 (1999), ICC ICArb. Bull. this issue, infra at 78.

51
See text accompanying note 43 supra.

52
See, e.g., the model contract proposed by ICC, supra note 4, Art. 11.1 of which states: 'The Buyer shall examine the goods as soon as possible after their arrival at destination and shall notify the Seller in writing of any lack of conformity of the goods within 15 days from the date when the Buyer discovers or ought to have discovered the lack of conformity. . . .'

53
According to Art. 4 CISG, 'except as otherwise expressly provided in this Convention, it is not concerned with: (a) the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any usage . . .'

54
See especially Franco Ferrari, 'CISG Case Law: A New Challenge For Interpreters?' [1998] IBLJ 495.